Issue of Duplication of Identities of Users Under Control: Nilekani

Issue of Duplication of Identities of Users Under Control: Nilekani is a Mint news report by Anirban Sen published on 30 June 2013. The piece covers a keynote address by Nandan Nilekani, then chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI), at the Indian Institute of Management (IIM) Bangalore, in which he claimed 99.99% system accuracy and brushed aside security and privacy concerns raised by Internet rights groups. The article counterpoints Nilekani’s assurances with a blog post by Sunil Abraham, arguing that the UID project’s reliance on the supposed infallibility of biometrics is deeply flawed in design.

Contents

  1. Article Details
  2. Full Text
  3. Context and Background
  4. External Link

Article Details

📰 Published in:
Mint
📅 Date:
30 June 2013
👤 Author:
Anirban Sen
📄 Type:
News Report
📰 Newspaper Link:
Read Online

Full Text

Bangalore: The Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) chief Nandan Nilekani said the government agency was in preliminary discussions with some embassies to use the Aadhaar project to simplify visa application procedures and that the issue of duplication of identities of users was well under control.

In March, a UIDAI spokesperson told Mint that it had detected 34,015 cases where one person had been issued two Aadhaar numbers. The figures represented a little over 0.01% of the 290 million people who had been enrolled at the time.

Nilekani, who was delivering a keynote address at a three-day conference on the success and failures of information technology (IT) in the public and private sector at the Indian Institute of Management in Bangalore, said the UIDAI system was almost completely accurate and duplication of identities was virtually negligible.

"Knowing what we know now, we believe we have accuracy of up to 99.99%," said Nilekani, chairman of the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI).

Nilekani, on Saturday, assured that the project was completely secure and user data and biometrics were safe in the hands of the agencies it works with and brushed aside any concerns on security of user data that have been widely raised by Internet security groups and activists.

"We're not giving any access to data, except when it is resident authorized. It is shared only when a resident participates in a transaction and authorizes the data which is shared," said Nilekani, who was one of the seven co-founders of India's second largest software exporter Infosys Ltd. He served as CEO of Infosys from 2002 to 2007.

"The system is also not open to the internet—the system has rings of authentications of service agencies. There are lots of concentric rings of security," he added. "The biometric data is not used except for enrolment, re-duplication and authentication."

Internet rights groups and activists such as Sunil Abraham of the Centre for Internet and Society (CIS), a research thinktank that focuses on issues of Internet governance, have often raised concerns over UID's overtly broad scope and privacy issues in the project.

"We don't need Aadhaar because we already have a much more robust identity management and authentication system based on digital signatures that has a proven track record of working at a "billions-of-users" scale on the Internet with reasonable security. The Unique Identification (UID) project based on the so-called "infallibility of biometrics" is deeply flawed in design. These design disasters waiting to happen cannot be permanently thwarted by band-aid policies," Abraham wrote in a blog post on the CIS website last year.

Nilekani also acknowledged that the department had faced several challenges, due to the sheer scale of the project that aims to cover the country's entire population of 1.2 billion.

"We have had lots of challenges on this project—we have backlogs of enrolment because we have more packets than we can process, we have backlogs of letter deliveries because we cannot handle so many letters…but fundamentally notwithstanding those challenges, we believe we are on the right track," said Nilekani.

Both UIDAI and the census department under the National Population Register project are recording biometric data, which includes fingerprint and iris data. Even though both the agencies reached a truce after a cabinet decision in January 2012 and were allowed to co-exist, there have been several reports of duplication between the two agencies in biometric collection.

UIDAI is not just being used as the main platform for rolling out the government's direct cash transfer scheme, but is also being regarded as an important authentication scheme for financial transactions and other security measures.

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Context and Background

This article was published on 30 June 2013, during a period of significant public and political scrutiny of the Aadhaar project. Nilekani was speaking at IIM Bangalore at a moment when UIDAI had crossed 290 million enrolments but was simultaneously under pressure on two fronts: the duplication problem that its own spokesperson had disclosed to Mint in March, and the broader constitutional and privacy challenges being mounted by civil society groups. His keynote was partly a defence of the project’s record and partly a pitch for its expanded use, including the visa application discussions with embassies that opened the article.

The 99.99% accuracy claim referenced in the article was presented in percentage terms, with UIDAI citing approximately 34,015 duplicate cases out of 290 million enrolments. While proportionally small, the absolute numbers were part of the ongoing public debate about scale, biometric reliability and error tolerance in a system intended to eventually cover over a billion residents.

Sunil Abraham’s contribution to the article is drawn from a CIS blog post rather than a fresh comment, and the reporter flags this clearly. The argument — that India already had a working digital signature-based identity system and that biometric uniqueness is not as infallible as UIDAI claimed — was a consistent thread in CIS’s critique of Aadhaar over this period. The phrase “design disasters waiting to happen” is pointed: it does not argue that Aadhaar had already failed, but that its architectural assumptions made eventual failure probable and that incremental policy fixes could not address foundational design problems. The final paragraphs of the article, covering the UIDAI–National Population Register duplication dispute and the project’s expanding role in financial transactions, highlight the expanding institutional role of Aadhaar alongside unresolved design and governance questions.

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