Sure, WhatsApp Secures Privacy, But Who's Monitoring Fake News?

Sure, WhatsApp Secures Privacy, But Who’s Monitoring Fake News? is an investigative report published by The Quint on 13 July 2017, written by Vineet Khare as part of the Swachh Digital India series co-produced with BBC Hindi. The article examines WhatsApp’s role as a distribution channel for fake news, political propaganda and hateful content, documenting its use during the 2017 Uttar Pradesh state elections. It features commentary from Sunil Abraham of Centre for Internet and Society on the economic ecosystem sustaining digital misinformation warriors and the need to attack financial incentives driving the fake news economy.

Article Details
Full Text
Context and Background
External Link

Article Details

📰 Published in:: The Quint
✍️ Author:: Vineet Khare
📅 Date:: 13 July 2017
📄 Type:: News Report
📺 Series:: Swachh Digital India (co-produced with BBC Hindi)
📰 Publication Link:: Read Online

Full Text

Beware of a WhatsApp group run by so-called ISIS for trapping Indian recruits.

Full fuel tanks could cause vehicular explosions in summers.

These messages could cause panic among WhatsApp users, but they're unverified.

In the age of an information glut, WhatsApp has arguably become the greatest purveyor of fake content.

With 200 million active Indian users in the market with over 300 million smartphone users by 2016 end, WhatsApp's reach is deep.

"WhatsApp announced that eight billion messages were shared on Diwali. Over 14 billion messages were shared on New Year's Eve. Out of this, 3.1 billion were pictures, 700 million GIFs and 610 million videos," said Neil Shah of Counterpoint Research.

No data is available on malicious, misleading content intended to spread rumours or hatred.

The app has end-to-end encryption, which means only the sender and the receiver can read the messages. With potential this huge and that level of encryption, critics allege WhatsApp is an endless pit for fake news, propaganda, malignant videos and messages with no oversight.

Worry

Cyber victim counsellor Debarati Halder is worried about the company's "silence on content dealing with gruesome violence, porn and sexual assault floating on the app."

No one knows what is being exchanged in hundreds of thousands of closed groups.

A company cannot turn a blind eye if someone is victimised by its services. If I want to report a profile, where should I go? The accused could buy another SIM if blocked.

With internet costs plummeting, the challenges for the authorities shall multiply.

All for Privacy

WhatsApp claims it can't read messages either because nothing is saved on its servers. It cites privacy and security as the reasons.

But is there anything at all that's saved?

A spokesperson of Facebook – the company that owns WhatsApp – said they are not engaging with outsiders on the issue.

Ethical hacker Rizwan Shaikh says the company does save some information.

"WhatsApp servers save mobile numbers, IP addresses, the operating systems used and hardware IDs. Cookies are inserted on web WhatsApp meant for desktops," said Shaikh.

Cookies are files that store favourite keywords for advertisement targeting.

Political Use

The incredible reach of this app was evident in the just-concluded UP state elections.

The BJP's IT army numbering over 6,000 'volunteers' operated over 10,000 groups to push "professionally designed" content to lure voters at the block level.

Each such group had 150-200 users. A dozen mobiles in Lucknow's party office – each mobile running nearly a thousand groups – ran the show, said a BJP official.

Experts argue that the availability of the web version has made things much easier for spammers who are running countless groups.

"About 50 million people in UP use the app – 80 percent under 45 years of age. Our every message pushed from Lucknow had a primary reach of 2.5 million, which when forwarded, extended our reach to 10-20 million for each message," said the official.

The Samajwadi Party operated over 4,000 groups but a party IT official conceded they couldn't match the BJP's firepower.

Both sides furiously deny pushing violent, hateful, communally divisive content, but the fact is that such content did find circulation.

If political parties did use WhatsApp as a campaign tool to push hate content, who was monitoring it? When the circulation of these messages is pointed out, the responsibility can always be laid on the shoulders of an "over enthusiastic soldier".

Adding Forces

What's adding to the phenomenon of fake news is the cheap availability of domain names with ready scripts and free social media sharing tools.

"As a result, the news moves very fast on WhatsApp and is impossible for agencies to track. It's like a black hole," says Vyapam scam whistle-blower Prashant Pandey.

This space is incomprehensible for many and therein reside unknown men and women designing content.

It would be safe to say that these individuals are driven by high octane emotions. Many of them are also on the payrolls of political parties and a section of corporates who target business competitors.

"Where do you think the videos of spiked drinks or insect-laced food videos are coming from?" asked an expert.

Silent Government?

There is a whole economy that sustains these 'digital warriors' on social media. Many of them consider themselves 'activists' providing 'social service', I was told by an ethical hacker.

"These people are paid twice – first by their hirers and then via ads on Facebook pages," said Sunil Abraham of Centre for Internet and Society.

Be it the rumour of Indian currency bearing a GPS chip or a fake video being blamed for fanning the riots in Muzaffarnagar, WhatsApp has the potential to spread dangerous untruths.

Experts say the priority now is to put mobile phones and digital services in people's hands and not discourage companies that are bringing in high-end tech.

The other view is that with WhatsApp reaping rich rewards for the ruling class because of its incredible reach, politicians do not want to rock the boat.

The WhatsApp business model is also unclear. WhatsApp doesn't provide analytics or a dashboard so finding out the reach of digital content via the number of clicks is not possible.

To snap the backbone of the fake news economy, Sunil Abraham argues that "there is a need to attack the financial incentives of the culprits and diversify the users' newsfeed."

Context and Background

This article appeared shortly after the Bharatiya Janata Party’s landslide victory in the March 2017 Uttar Pradesh assembly elections, where the party secured 312 of 403 seats. The scale of the BJP’s digital operation documented here represented a watershed moment in Indian electoral politics, demonstrating how encrypted messaging platforms could be weaponised for mass political mobilisation whilst evading regulatory oversight.

The BJP’s deployment of over 6,000 volunteers operating 10,000 WhatsApp groups with 150-200 members each created an unprecedented information distribution network. The Lucknow command centre’s capacity to reach 2.5 million users directly, with forwarding mechanisms extending reach to 10-20 million, transformed how political campaigns operated in India’s most populous state. The Samajwadi Party’s acknowledgement that its 4,000 groups could not match the BJP’s “firepower” highlighted the asymmetry in digital campaign capabilities.

The article’s reference to “professionally designed” content pointed to sophisticated production capacities backing these operations. Unlike spontaneous political discourse, the material distributed through these networks bore hallmarks of coordinated messaging strategies, with visual assets, messaging frameworks and targeting parameters developed by communications professionals. The anonymisation provided by WhatsApp’s architecture allowed parties to deny responsibility for inflammatory content, attributing it to “over enthusiastic soldiers” rather than organisational strategy.

Sunil Abraham’s observation about digital warriors being “paid twice” illuminated the economic incentives sustaining misinformation ecosystems. Beyond direct compensation from political or corporate clients, these actors monetised their Facebook pages through advertising revenue, creating self-reinforcing financial loops. The reference to spiked drinks and insect-laced food videos alluded to content designed to damage restaurant or beverage brand reputations, suggesting corporate information warfare tactics had migrated to encrypted platforms.

The Muzaffarnagar reference concerned the August-September 2013 riots in western Uttar Pradesh that killed over 60 people and displaced 40,000, many from Muslim communities. Fake videos allegedly showing communal violence circulated on social media platforms including WhatsApp, inflaming tensions. By July 2017, when this article appeared, the role of digital misinformation in triggering real-world violence had become undeniable, yet regulatory frameworks remained inadequate.

Sunil Abraham’s prescription to “attack the financial incentives” and “diversify users’ newsfeeds” reflected emerging thinking on countering misinformation through economic disincentives and algorithmic interventions. However, WhatsApp’s refusal to implement recommendation algorithms or provide analytics dashboards complicated such efforts. The platform’s business model opacity meant even basic metrics about content reach remained unavailable to researchers, regulators and users themselves. The political reluctance to regulate WhatsApp that the article identified would persist for another year until mob lynchings forced the government and platform to act.