Now, Aadhaar Details Displayed in Mizoram Too
Now, Aadhaar Details Displayed in Mizoram Too is a National Herald article written by Sebastian PT and published on 26 April 2017. The article documents a series of data leaks in which government websites across Jharkhand, Chandigarh, Kerala, and Mizoram publicly displayed Aadhaar numbers and associated personal details of citizens — in direct violation of Section 29 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016. Sunil Abraham is quoted extensively on the irreversibility of biometric data breaches, the structural insecurity of the Aadhaar system, and the risks of the government’s “seeding” approach to linking Aadhaar with other databases.
Contents
Article Details
- 📰 Published in:
- National Herald
- 📅 Date:
- 26 April 2017
- 👤 Author:
- Sebastian PT
- 📄 Type:
- News Report
- 🔗 Original URL:
- Not available online
Full Text
Could there be a method to the madness? Or is it just carelessness? From the Jharkhand Government to the Union Territory of Chandigarh to the Union Ministry of Water and Sanitation to even Mizoram's Food and Civil Supplies Department, government websites are found to have displayed Aadhaar details of citizens, a crime under the law.
In Jharkhand, details of 16 lakh beneficiaries – their bank account details, ration card and the 12-digit Aadhaar number – were displayed on the website of the Directorate of Social Security. Similar blunders were witnessed from different corners of the country from Chandigarh to Kerala, where details of 35 lakh people have been breached. This flies in the face of the Government's repeated claims on data privacy, that Aadhaar details are completely safe.
The law doesn't allow this. The displaying of the Aadhaar data, for instance, is in clear violation of Section 29 of the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016. The provision clearly says that "no" Aadhaar number or core biometric information of an Aadhaar number holder shall be "published, displayed or posted publicly".
"There appears to be no regulation worth the name as far as the Aadhaar project is concerned," says economist Reetika Khera from IIT Delhi.
So, will these officials responsible be punished according to the Act? More importantly, what about the damage of leaking such sensitive, apparently confidential data?
Irreparable Damage
Several cyber security experts have been warning of the possibility of precisely such leaks and Opposition parties were vociferously pointing this out while the Centre was brazenly violating the Supreme Court's orders and forcibly extending Aadhaar to almost everything – including it being linked to one's Permanent Account Number (PAN), used for filing income tax.
"What has been broken through technology, can't be fixed with the law," says Sunil Abraham, Executive Director of Bangalore-based research organisation, the Centre for Internet and Society.
The data breach just made it easy for players in the black market for ID (identification) documents to be lapped up to create false ID cards, for instance.
When demonetisation was being implemented, sources say that black money hoarders apparently bought fake IDs which were made from stolen Aadhaar details to get the old notes exchanged – one way for doing this was perhaps by opening new bank accounts or to, say, utilise unused Jan Dhan accounts to deposit the money. Now, one can only imagine what terrorists can do with these details.
So far, perhaps, the only solace is that the biometric details of the beneficiaries weren't leaked. But, in the backdrop of the lax attitude of the various government departments, even that too is just waiting to happen, fear experts.
Abraham warns that Aadhaar was always a risky proposition as it was based on biometrics, which "made it very insecure". He terms it as a "mass surveillance technology" – that too a poorly-designed technology – which, in fact, "undermines security". Once biometric data are compromised, it cannot be secured again. Instead of biometrics, he suggests the UIDAI shift to using smart cards.
The unfettered forcible linking of almost everything – from bank accounts to one's PAN card – to Aadhaar only makes things worse. "The Centre is 'seeding' the various data bases with the Aadhaar number, which is a very bad move. And, involving various private and public agencies in this only makes the entire thing very precarious," warns Abraham. He points out that, for instance, when the PAN cards are linked with the Aadhaar number, breach made possible.
Instead, he says, the government should adopt the 'tokenisation approach', instead of the 'seeding approach'. What this means is that, say, if the PAN card is to be linked to Aadhaar, then UIDAI issues a token number and not the original 12-digit Aadhaar number. So, even if a breach happens, the hacker will not be able to get all the Aadhaar details, he says.
However, the government does not seem to be taking the issue of privacy very seriously. What perhaps is not being understood is that this is not just a privacy issue, but making the masses vulnerable to frauds. Instead of treading cautiously in implementing Aadhaar, the government seems to be in a hurry to extend it to almost every possible silo in an individual's life.
"Given the callous attitude of central and state governments, I hope that the Supreme Court will stop the government from a forced linking of Aadhaar, on the one hand, and bank accounts and PAN numbers on the other hand," says Khera.
Context and Background
This article was published in April 2017, at the height of India’s Aadhaar enrolment drive and the government’s aggressive push to link the 12-digit biometric identifier with bank accounts, PAN cards, mobile numbers, and other databases. The leaks documented by Sebastian PT — affecting millions of citizens across multiple states — came just months after the Aadhaar Act, 2016 had been passed, and at a time when several petitions challenging the constitutional validity of Aadhaar were pending before the Supreme Court.
Sunil Abraham’s quoted remarks in this article cover four distinct but related arguments: that technology-enabled data breaches are irreversible and cannot be remedied through law after the fact; that Aadhaar as a biometric system is structurally insecure by design; that the government’s practice of “seeding” the Aadhaar number across multiple databases compounds the risk by creating a universal identifier that links otherwise separate data silos; and that a tokenisation approach — where a unique token rather than the actual Aadhaar number is used for each linking — would substantially reduce the damage from any individual breach. These arguments formed a consistent strand of CIS’s public commentary on Aadhaar throughout 2016–2018.
The Supreme Court’s five-judge constitutional bench delivered its judgment on Aadhaar in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India in September 2018, upholding the scheme’s validity for government welfare programmes while striking down its mandatory use by private entities. The concerns about data leaks from government websites that this article documents continued to surface in subsequent years, most notably in the January 2018 Tribune report by Rachna Khaira, which revealed that Aadhaar data for over a billion people could be accessed for Rs 500.
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