Biometry Is Watching
Biometry Is Watching is an Outlook India field report published on 10 May 2010. Sugata Srinivasaraju documents the Aadhaar (UID) pilot project in Karnataka villages, observing ground-level implementation difficulties including fingerprint scanning problems for manual labourers, widespread misinformation about the programme’s purpose, and infrastructure constraints. The article features Sunil Abraham’s critique of centralised biometric databases and civil society demands for privacy safeguards before nationwide rollout.
Contents
Article Details
- 📰 Published in:
- Outlook India
- 📅 Date:
- 10 May 2010
- 👤 Author:
- Sugata Srinivasaraju
- 📄 Type:
- Field Report
- 📰 Publication Link:
- Read Online
Full Text
Three women are fighting to take one chair in a classroom of a government school in Chelur village, in Gubbi taluka of Tumkur district. One sits on the lap of another and the third tries to push them both off the chair. What all three want is to be the first to be profiled under the Centre's ambitious Aadhaar or unique identity number (UID) project. Their squabbling holds up the documentation by nearly 20 minutes, and the crowd outside, standing in line in the afternoon sun, grows restless. To calm them, the village revenue secretary orders the distribution of another round of buttermilk.
Chelur is one of four villages in the district picked for field trials before the 12-digit UIDs are assigned to people later in the year. Besides Tumkur, the pilot project is simultaneously running in seven villages of Mysore district. Each village has been given a target of 2,400-2,500 profiles to be completed in 20 days. This involves photographing the face, imaging the iris and scanning all ten digits of each person profiled and assigned a UID.
Villagers are enthusiastic about this rigorous profiling process even though there's little awareness about the true purpose of the exercise. This is because of some falsehoods that have somehow spread in these areas. Nagamma, an elderly woman coming out after being profiled, thinks her eyes had been tested and found to be in perfect condition. Another middle-aged woman thought the exercise would bring her a new ration card—one that would entitle her family to an extra four kilos of rice. Some others were in a tizzy that if they didn't undergo this "photography" their BPL cards would be taken away. Most, however, had queued up because they didn't want to be left out of a sarkari exercise their neighbours were submitting to. Of the dozen people Outlook spoke to, only Muniswamy could tell us that this process would ensure that no one had more than one voter ID card or ration card—the way it should be, unlike some in his village who had illegally acquired two of each.
The village authorities have been doing little to counter the misinformation because their attention is focused on other compelling matters, like meeting the assigned target. This is an important issue because gram panchayat elections have been declared in Karnataka and lots of youngsters set off for campaigning early in the morning and would be difficult to locate for profiling.
According to official figures, Chelur has a population of 5,000, with 3,640 people above the age of 18. A random selection of 2,400 has been made from this to meet the UID target. The number seems small, but handling it at the village level can be demanding for the local authorities—there's no police for crowd control, refreshments have to be distributed and the computerised work has to be done despite the power outages. Using generators has become inevitable, for the villages get hardly four or five hours' power supply.
Another problem lies in obtaining the fingerprints of rural folk: most of them are engaged in manual labour or farm work and arrive with dirty palms that defeat the biometric reading machines. Pails of water, detergent and towels are provided for cleaning up. Much time is lost in such rescanning and it goes against the official estimate of five minutes for the young, nine for the elderly.
Prasanna Kumar, the village secretary, admits to the problems. "We did not make an open announcement for the UID pilot because we didn't want to attract large crowds. We quietly prepared a random list of 2,400 people from the ration card database and went door-to-door to invite them," he says. "We have left out people above the age of 80 and under 18. We told people this identity number will help them access various government schemes. Fingerprinting is the toughest problem. Initially people were reluctant, but suddenly they have become curious."
H. Gnanesh, the tehsildar, says the ongoing step is only "concept testing"; the next will be rechecking, in which those already profiled will verify their identity details against what has been stored. Only after that will the UID be issued. In Chelur village, the concept testing ended on May 4; rechecking began the very next day.
Some NGOs observing the process have noted the lack of awareness in villagers. "They are clueless about what they are taking part in," say Mahadev Prasad and Murthy, of the Basava Seva Trust. Murthy says fingerprinting is a big problem. He speaks of Hommaragalli, in Mysore district, where some foreign experts had to be called in to take a look at the scanning machines.
Then there are larger issues. Away from the surging crowds in Chelur, civil society organisations like the Centre for Internet & Society, the Alternative Law Forum and PUCL have been demanding greater dialogue. In fact, they have even suggested a review of the scheme. They argue there is no clarity on how the government proposes to store and secure personal and biometric data, given the fact that various agencies such as banks, telecom companies and government departments would potentially access it. Security is a huge concern also because the software, hardware and expertise of foreign companies is being used. These NGOs say the UID data, the National Population Registry and the NATGRID, when connected, could prove a grave threat to civil liberties.
"First, a centralised database, like the UID will create, has never been safe," says Sunil Abraham of CIS. "It needs to be decentralised like our various mail servers. Second, we feel the collection of biometric data is happening at the wrong end of the pyramid. Instead of putting the poor through the process first, why not start with those with financial dealings of Rs 1 crore and above. Third, one study says 48 per cent of our people cannot remember a 12-digit ID. Fourth, we need privacy laws in place before the UID regime sets in."
Those problems apart, even raising the level of the current exercise—from small samples of a few thousand each to profiling the billion-plus population of India—could place severe demands on our shaky administration. There's a mountain to be moved.
Context and Background
This report documented the earliest field trials of India’s Aadhaar programme, conducted in Karnataka villages during May 2010 before nationwide implementation began. The pilot phase revealed substantial gaps between programme design and ground realities, particularly regarding public understanding, technical challenges, and infrastructure limitations.
Misinformation spread rapidly amongst participants. Many villagers believed they were receiving eye tests, new ration card entitlements, or risked losing Below Poverty Line cards if they abstained. Only one person interviewed by the reporter understood the programme’s actual purpose of preventing duplicate identity documents. This knowledge deficit suggested inadequate communication strategies during early implementation.
Biometric scanning difficulties affected precisely those populations the programme aimed to serve. Manual labourers and agricultural workers arrived with degraded fingerprints that machines struggled to read, requiring repeated attempts and extending processing times beyond official estimates. This technical limitation persisted throughout Aadhaar’s subsequent rollout, affecting authentication reliability for various services.
Infrastructure constraints compounded implementation challenges. Villages received only four to five hours of electricity daily, necessitating generator use. Local authorities lacked resources for crowd management, requiring distribution of refreshments to maintain order. These logistical difficulties raised questions about scaling the programme to cover India’s billion-plus population.
Civil society organisations including CIS, Alternative Law Forum, and PUCL issued early warnings about data security and civil liberties implications. Sunil Abraham’s critique highlighted four key concerns: centralised databases’ vulnerability compared to distributed systems, regressive targeting starting with the poor rather than wealthy individuals, cognitive difficulties remembering 12-digit numbers, and absence of privacy legislation before biometric collection commenced.
The anticipated integration of UID with the National Population Registry and NATGRID surveillance system intensified privacy concerns. Critics argued this interconnection would enable comprehensive tracking of citizens’ movements, financial transactions, and communications, creating surveillance infrastructure without adequate legal safeguards or democratic oversight.
Foreign companies’ involvement in providing software, hardware, and expertise raised data sovereignty questions. Critics worried that biometric and demographic information of Indian citizens might be accessible to entities outside governmental control, though UIDAI maintained security protocols prevented such access.
The programme proceeded despite these concerns, eventually enrolling over a billion people. Many issues identified in this early report—fingerprint authentication failures, awareness gaps, infrastructure inadequacies, and privacy debates—remained contentious throughout Aadhaar’s implementation and subsequent judicial scrutiny.
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